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Zusammenfassung
Von der Salafiyya zur Politik: die politische 
Partizipation von Frauen und die Entwicklung 
der Salafiyya-Bewegungen in Ägypten
Der Beitrag beleuchtet das Engagement von 
Frauen im Umfeld der Salafiyya. Dazu wird 
gefragt, auf welche Weise Frauen an der Po-
litisierung der Salafiyya-Strömungen teilha-
ben. Um dieser Frage nachzugehen, werden 
in einem induktiven Vorgehen zentrale Bei-
träge von Frauen zur Verbreitung der Salafi-
yya-Ideologie analysiert. Zudem wird die Teil-
nahme der Frauen – durch soziale Netzwerke 
wie Facebook oder ägyptischen Medien – am 
Prozess der Politisierung der Salafiyya nach 
dem Aufstand von 2011 untersucht.
Schlüsselwörter 
Ägypten, Salafismus, Politisierung, Revoluti-
on, Frauen, Empowerment
Summary
This article investigates women’s involvement 
in the Salafi milieu. We ask how women fol-
low and participate in the politicization of 
Salafi trends. To answer this question, we an-
alyze, through an inductive approach, their 
important contributions in spreading Salafi 
ideology. Then, we investigate their participa-
tion – through social networks (e.g., Face-
book, Egyptian media) – in the process of 
Salafi politicization in the aftermath of the 
2011 uprising.
Keywords 
Egypt, Salafism, politicization, revolution, 
women’s empowerment
1 Introduction
The Salafi appeal to take part in the January 2011 demonstrations brought out numerous 
Salafi movement supporters to Tahrir Square, among them women dressed in khimâr1 
and niqâb. Their sudden appearance on the public scene and then on the political stage 
brought them into the spotlight and helped them gain legitimacy in some Salafi spheres. 
This shift, along with the decision of some Salafi movements to enter the political arena, 
was in contradiction with traditional Salafi stances. To justify them, these movements 
were eventually led to operate a rhetorical shift.  
After the revolutionary uprisings, a new face of salafiyya2 became visible, operating 
mostly within the civil society as well as in the realm of politics, raising the question of 
1 The khimâr is a long veil which covers the head and the body with the face being visible, contrary 
to the niqâb which covers the entire body and even the face. 
2 “Salafiyât” is the female form of “Salafi”. The majority of women in this religious current identified 
themselves as such. By this label, they connect to the lineage of the first Muslims. They also use a 
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women’s role in the Salafi movements and the impact of the Arab Spring in their agen-
cy. In several Arab countries, the 2011 revolutionary uprisings have propelled Salafis 
 (Rougier and Lacroix 2015: 4)3 – hitherto confined to preaching field – into the political 
and media scene. In Egypt, this phenomenon took a particular turn. Over decades, these 
Salafis managed to enroot a strong local base of support, which enabled them to win 
an important share of seats in the parliament in the following elections4. Some Salafi 
movements hence entered politics determined to play the game: they expressed their 
will to abide by democratic rules and by the new electoral set of laws introduced prior to 
the 2011–2012 parliamentary elections. These new regulations included a compulsory 
nomination quota for women in all political parties. To stay in the race, the Salafi party 
was compelled to make women run for elections for the first time in history and hence 
to allow them to enter the political arena alongside men.
This analysis aims to plug the gaps stemming from the lack of information on 
the place and role of women within the Salafi movements in Egypt. Gender-related 
issues within Salafi movements in the Arab world have not attracted much attention 
amongst social science’s scholars. Sabâh Mahmoud for example undertakes an ethno-
graphic  study about women operating in what she phrases as the “mosques movement” 
(Mahmoud 2005: 14) in the late 1990s in Cairo. She refers – without distinction – to a 
large variety of movements, religious trends and aims to highlight the role of dâ‘iyât 
(female preachers) in the da‘wa (the preach) practice. Although she addresses the issue 
it is difficult to get a holistic view of the matter through Mahmoud’s work as she barely 
mentions dâ‘iyât and does not differentiate between the various Salafi groups they iden-
tify with. Hence, this work attempts to fill this gap. 
To do so, we need to break free from mainstream essentialist discourses that victi-
mize these women (Dayan-Herzbrun 2005: 118), or subjugate them to manipulation. 
This article aims at emphasizing women’s contribution to the build-up of a community 
that still retains its own identity. We will see how the fight against the first feminist 
movement in Egypt (Badran 1995: 178) enabled Salafi women access to a higher so-
cial status, writing for famous Salafi reviews, practicing da‘wa, which ensures them 
even a key status within Salafi movements. Then, within the framework of a logic of 
“diff erentiation” between men and women – considering women in their “sexual role” 
(Mead 1963: 256) – we will look into the new Salafi discourse that emerged during the 
immediate aftermath of the uprisings. Thereafter, I will analyse the impact of Salafi 
women’s participation to the 2011 uprising in their empowerment.  
This study is part of a larger anthropological project about women’s impact in Salafi 
movements in Egypt, undertaken in the frame of my ongoing PhD thesis. This article’s 
findings are part of the first results. It provides a first look at this new feminine exposure 
through the reconfiguration lens of the Salafi ideology, and the profound turmoil it has 
experienced since the 2011 uprisings. I approached a dozen of women, from January 
to June 2016 in Cairo and Alexandria, who follow or used to follow the Salafi doc-
second word which is al-multazima, it is translated as “the one who is committed in God’s path”. 
3 In the introduction on the book Qu’est-ce que le salafisme? Rougier identifies three kinds of Salaf-
ism: quietist or pacifist, reformist and jihadist. The pacifist Salafism “stresses on the necessity of 
obeying the political authorities” (2013: 15).
4 The Salafi bloc – headed by the al-Nûr party – won over a quarter of the ballots on the 2011–2012 
parliamentary elections (Steuer 2013a).
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trine, doing a participative observation and learning from their individual and collective 
empowerment (Zimmerman: 2000: 44). Through an inductive approach, I led direct 
and semi-direct interviews to understand their lifestyle and the way they entered and 
affiliated with the Salafi movement. This study will then expose the participation of 
women in the process of Salafi politicisation. To do so, I have followed some candidates 
on Facebook to understand how they participate in the political game as members of the 
Salafi al-Nûr party. In the following, the impact of their participation in demonstrations 
will be approached as a way of “agentivity” and “gender performativity” (Butler 1990: 
47), through new voices which appeared in the public and on the political scene. 
2 Da’wa Salafiyya5 and Women’s Participation in Building 
Up Salafi Communities
The revolutionary uprisings gave the salafiyât an exposure they did not have before. 
Media took up the phenomenon, criticising their conservatism and accusing them of all 
the Egyptian society’s diseases6. However, the salafiyât have been present since the out-
set of Salafism in Egypt in the 1930s and have played key roles within Salafism. In the 
following, I will elaborate how women participated in establishing these communities 
with a distinct identity and I show how they gradually gained legitimacy inside the first 
Salafi movement – for instance through their fight against the early feminist movements 
– while remaining in their “gender role” (Mead 1963: 356). 
2.1 The Birth of Salafism in Egypt
There is no doubt that women have been present and active in the Salafi Egyptian milieu 
since its outset. Accounts of women’s involvement in Salafi movements can be traced 
back as far as the 1930s, when the first Salafi school in Egypt was founded, called Jamâ‘a 
Ansâr as-Sunnah al-Muhammadiyya, which means the “Association of the Proponents 
of the Prophetic Sunnah”. This first Salafi school was created in 1926 in Cairo by an 
Azhari graduate: Muhammad Ahmad al-Fiqqî (1892–1958). He was born in the Beheira 
governorate. His father was a student at Al-Azhar University7 and shared Muhammad 
‘Abduh’s room, a famous reformist figure. Al-Fiqqî witnessed the 1919 Revolution, 
but contrary to the majority of his counterparts, he rejected it, denouncing the partici-
pation of women and Copts. As Stéphane Lacroix writes, contrary to his coeval Hassan 
 al-Banna, who founded the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928, al-Fiqqî was not concerned by 
the British occupation and by establishing an Islamic state. For him, the deep evil suf-
fer ed by Muslims was neither political nor religious but existed within them, in that they 
had forgotten the real meaning of “transcendence” and the principle of divine oneness: 
al-tawhid (Lacroix 2012: 29). Al-Fiqqî formed this school to thwart what he con sidered 
a spirituality “vacuum” in the society that Al-Azhar had failed to fill up. Al-Fiqqî’s 
preaching focused on pure monotheism and the protection of the Sunnah. He started 
5 Salafi preach.
6 This happened mainly after the 2013 military coup.
7 One of the prestigious universities in the Arab world, far-famed for its religious teaching. 
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to refer to religious figures coming from Arabia, unknown in Egypt, to understand the 
principle of pure monotheism (tawhid). Under al-Fiqqî’s leadership, Ansâr as-Sunnah 
al-Muhamadiyya proclaimed its dedication to al-tawhid as preached by Mohamed Ibn 
‘Abd al-Wahhab, the co-founder of Saudi Arabia. Al-Fiqqî focused his discourse on 
the popular literary genre of the Hanbali school8 concentrating on a specific definition 
of the “profession of faith” and listed the main tenets of Islam: divine omnipotence in 
good and evil; the rule of prophetic figure as mediator between God and man; defence 
of the uncreated nature of the Koran and therefore of its universal and eternal validity; 
predetermination of human acts and the denial of free will; the affirmation of the unity 
of the community and the unconditional obedience to the government, even in cases 
of impiety. They have to be cleaned of blameworthy innovations and go back to pure 
monotheism respecting the orthodoxy, the orthopraxis and the public authority (Mouline 
2011: 45). Through this discourse the members of Ansâr as-Sunnah al-Muhammadiyya 
denounce religious and traditional practices, e.g. the cult of saints, considered by them 
as un-Islamic. To talk to God through divined saints is considered by Salafis as an “as-
sociationism blameworthy” and is considered as a (step) backward to polytheism. The 
ideas of al-Fiqqî were full of resentment toward Sufism. The rigorist social norm vision 
of Salafis came to break with the widespread Egyptian practice of the Sufi order which 
was still followed by a majority of Egyptians in the beginning of 1920s. 
Salafis aimed to reform society by applying conservative social rules, similar to  those 
applied by the Saudi Arabian monarchy (Lacroix 2016: 30). So the Salafi  rigorist project 
of changing the religious practice of Muslims was different from the Brotherhood’s 
aims, mainly political, and far more flexible regarding social norms.  Hassan al-Banna, 
the founder of the Brotherhood, was known for his Sufî aspirations. The first decades of 
the Ansâr as-Sunnah al-Muhamadiyya did not attract many Egyptians. The fundamen-
t alist discourse of the Salafi school was listened only by a minor part of Egyptians, 
composed by the religious intellectual class from al-Azhar, like the founder himself. 
At the same time, during the 1930s and 40s, the Brotherhood experienced significant 
growth. It became a mass movement, consequently facing a fierce repression under 
Nasser’s rule. In the early 1980s, due to President Sadat’s assassination by a branch of 
the movement, they became the target of a strong repression designed by Egypt’s new 
president,  Moubarak. This gave Salafis the opportunity to spread in preaching terri-
tories. Additionally, Saudi Arabia’s economic growth, thanks to oil revenues, allowed 
the Wahhabi doctrine penetration in Egypt, democratising the Salafi discourse, through 
mosques preaches and books publications. 
2.2 Women’s Presence in the Egyptian Salafi School
Women’s involvement has been visible since the first decades of the Salafi school 
through writings for the reviews of Ansâr al-Sunnah. Among the women who were 
active in the harakâ salafiyya (Salafi movement), in the early 20th century, a woman by 
the name of Ni‘mat Sidqî stands out for the work she carried out in close collaboration 
with the Ansâr as-Sunnah al-Muhammadiyya group (Zaghlûl 2016: 136). She published 
manifold articles in Salafi reviews; known as Ansâr as-Sunnah, al-Hudâ  al-Nabawî and 
8 One of the four madhhabs (schools of religious thought forming Islamic law) in Sunni Islam.
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al-Tawhîd. In her articles, she denounces the unveiling (of women’s faces), al-sufûr in 
Arabic, and promotes wearing the hijâb. She also published a pamphlet in 1971 entitled 
al-Tabarruj9, the eponymous concept developed in different intellectual currents of the 
Sunni Islam, which has particular significance in minhâj salafi (Salafi methodology). 
The word tabarruj can be translated as “adornment” and understood as the fact that men 
and women alike expose physical attributes for seduction. However, in her writings 
Ni‘mat Sidqî targets particularly women in the peculiar context of the late 1920s and 
early 1940s. At that time, secular/nationalist feminism embodied by Huda Cha’raoui 
(Badran 1995: 42) became popular in the upper and middle classes. Sonia Dayan- 
Herzbrun explains that “in pursuing philanthropic activities, but in giving a ‘wafdist’ 
rationale, they [secular feminist women] expanded their social base, but not enough 
however, as shown by the birth of Marxist and Islamist oppositions a few years later”10 
(Dayan-Herzbrun 1998: 120). In her writings, Ni‘mat Sidqi addresses first and foremost 
secular feminists and sharply criticizes the unveiling of women. She reproaches women 
for their use of western references and harshly condemns this feminism that does not 
respect the true and authentic Salafist’ Islam (Hegghammer 2009: 267). Through her 
fight against feminism Ni‘mat Sidqî gained legitimacy and received a special exposure 
within the Salafi movement, being published alongside famous personalities of Salafi 
manhâj such as Mohamed Abd al-Majîd al-Shafi‘î, Jama‘â chief in the early 1970s. She 
did so by staying to its woman area of predilection, committed to her “gender role” as 
described by Margaret Mead (1963: 145). A “gender role” is built through represen-
tation framed by the Egyptian society in which female “temperament” is described as 
delicate and a source of tension.   
Hence, she participated in the da‘wa practice through her writings; albeit not limited 
to it. She also granted tazqîya (recommendation letters) enabling holders to get access 
to Salafi circles. This practice has continued to present days. To gain entrée in a Salafi 
school one must acquire a status; provided upon recommendation by a well-accredited 
figure in the milieu. For example, she recommended Sheikh ‘Abd al-Rahmân al-Wakîl 
(1913–1971), who would later play a substantial role in jamâ‘at Ansâr as-Sunnah al- 
Muhammadiyya and would work together with the founder of the association, Sheikh 
Muhammad Hâmid al-Fiqqî. These facts highlight the importance of this woman who 
seems to have acquired a dedicated role along with a sound legitimacy within the move-
ment. 
The Ansâr As-Sunnah al-Muhammadiyya group seems to be fully aligned with the 
usages of his time. Indeed, as most newly formed associations of this period – between 
1920 and 1960 – their message targeted the elites. Hence, the – mostly illiterate – pop-
ulace did not have access to the Salafi message that propagated through newspapers and 
did not visit mosques to listen to the khutba (preach) of the sheikhs. At this time, the 
religious practices of the Sufi orders and acts were dominant in the country (De Jong 
1983: 183). It was not until the second half of the 1960s that a “democratisation” of the 
Salafi religious terminology began to expand with preaches delivered in colloquial Ara-
bic; by definition, accessible to everyone. In the meantime, broadcasting technologies 
had enabled a new way for the expansion of the Salafi message.
9 www.saaid.net/feraq/mthahb/8.htm
10 This translation is not accredited.
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2.3  The Key Status of the Dâ‘iyât Movement
The role of Salafi dâ‘iyât (female preachers) in the expansion of Salafi thought in the 
1960s in the lower social classes was of crucial importance. Hence, this period can be 
associated with the broadcast of dâ‘iyât, notably through the “democratisation” of the 
Salafi and Islamist message; enabled by President Anouar Al-Sadate’s ascent to power. 
He put in place the Infitâh policy, pardoned Islamists imprisoned by Nasser, opening up 
the way for Islamists of different Sunni currents in universities, where the socialists had 
a strong base. Jama‘ât islâmiyât (Islamic associations) were set up first in Cairo and 
Alexandria universities around this time and were driven by the government’s desire to 
eradicate Nasser’s legacy. I met two women who attended these universities at this time, 
Mona and Sofia, who both adopted the Salafi doctrine.
Mona11 enrolled in the medical school at Alexandria University12 in 1977. She was 
one of the few girls wearing the veil at that time. She was 15 years old when she decided 
to wear it; swayed by a high school teacher in Damanhur. Her family, originally from 
Alexandria, moved to a capital city in Upper Egypt. Mona was already mutadayina (re-
ligious) when she entered university. She got used to praying in the university’s masjîd 
(prayer hall), where she met several women wearing the niqâb. She then socialised with 
the masjîd’s manager who was also wearing it. A few years older than her, the amîra 
al-jamâ’a (the group’s chief) provided her with substantial support with the university 
work (being more advanced) and with her religious practice. This Salafi trend inscribed 
itself in a movement aiming to promote Islam’s good practice in daily life and good be-
haviour of Muslim women outside their household, which she was more likely to leave 
to study or work in order to support her multiple family members.
The second woman we met in Cairo was a former preacher in minhaj salafi. Sofia 
was educated in a liberal middle-class family in which there was no noticeable reli-
gious practice. It was only after entering Cairo University that she accessed the jama’a 
 salafiyya and made a name for herself. She was a well-known preacher between the 
late 1980s and early 1990s, before leaving the movement in 1994. Her story is a good 
example of the organisational structure of the jama’a where women had assigned roles 
and an attributed place within the women’s section. Some members’ role was to attract 
female students to the jama’a and other women who were in charge of teaching basics 
of Islamic education and of working with them on Wahhabi doctrine’s scriptures. It 
is  worth noting that there was a hierarchy amongst the preachers. Every two weeks, 
the “great preacher”’, a woman named Oum Hudhayfah, held a dars (lesson). When 
she came, as explained by Sofia, the meeting would not be held in Cairo University 
campus, but rather at Qasr al-‘Aïni medical school, in Munîra district. Female students 
came from every corner of Cairo University to listen to her. She also recalls that “Oum 
Hudhayfah would sit on a chair with us encircling her, sitting on the floor. She was very 
good and showed a great mastery of the scriptures.” Sofia further explains that she start-
ed praying in this circle and that the first books she read were those of Ibn Taymiyya13. 
11 To preserve the confidentiality of the women I interviewed, all names were changed. 
12 The da’wa salafiyya movement was created here and became one of the most important Salafi 
movements in the country. The al-Nûr party, founded after the 2011 uprising, originated from this 
movement. 
13 Ibn Taymiyya was a Sunni Muslim theologian, juriconsult, and reformer of the Hanbali School. He 
lived in the thirteenth century.  His writings have a particular echo in the Salafi currents.
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From her account we get an idea of how the preachers proceeded to set up a community 
that they educate according to the Salafi approach. Sofia was later assigned to preach-
ing. She chose to do da‘wa; developing her own methodology. “I was very humane and 
touching. I worked with human beings regarding them plainly as they were and not like 
machines”. She pointed out that she had received a very strict training including learn-
ing by heart which often was tough. “I would elaborate a discourse with simple and 
emotional words, and that was efficient since my discourse would make many people 
come. I took philosophy classes at the university, which helped me get a vocabulary 
base that I used for my da‘wa.”
Sofia was in the faculty of arts and social sciences. Her counterparts reproached 
her for choosing this academic path and tried to make her change it. However, Sofia ex-
plained to me that it was out of question for her to give up on what she had always loved 
as a child who grew up in a household in which literature played an important role. She 
explained to the students of the jama’a that she would continue this path to gain the 
necessary knowledge to fight “evil”. I observed monitoring of circle’s members by the 
sheikh (spiritual guide) at all levels. The student’s life is inspected, even with regards 
to marital matters, arranged by the men’s section of the jama’a salafiyya. Here again, 
it is interesting to see the unfolding of the matriarchal system that constitutes networks 
within the jama’a. Mona, who married a man from the jama’a, explains: 
“It is very complicated, but there is a marriage system that exists. It is a system of networks where your 
married friend asks her husband to find you a husband. This is the only way. A man who is looking 
for a wife would talk to a husband, who in turn asks his wife, and it is her who will find a wife for her 
husband’s friend. In this fashion, we look out for each other”. 
This practice allowed the creation of closed circles with mutual dependence between 
members. This method is still in practice and Mona’s son, who got married a few years 
ago, resorted to his mother to find him a wife. 
Women in the movement play an essential role here as they are in charge of finding 
husbands for their spouse’ friends; hence maintaining the circle closed. Sofia’s role in 
these preaching sessions was to promote the niqâb. She would advocate it using argu-
ments such as it being a symbol for a woman’s rapprochement to God by following 
the Prophet’s wives example covering her face as per verse 53 of the surât al-Ahzâb14. 
They operated in several neighbourhoods in Cairo. Sofia’s status illustrates Mahmoud’s 
(2005) and Du Chaffaut’s (2011) point who in their studies speak of a “feminisation” 
of religion reaching its tipping point in the beginning of the 1990s. This feminisation 
is associated with the above-mentioned “democratisation” of Salafi thought. Preaches 
were delivered in popular areas’ mosques or in private Salafi institutes that grew in num-
ber. Materials expanded (audio tapes were available in local markets in popular areas, 
reviews, etc.) allowing a greater accessibility to the khitâb (religious discourse) of the 
Salafi sheikhs (Haenni 2005: 39).
Salafis managed, over years, to blend themselves in the interstices of the Egyptian 
social fabric. Women participated in the build-up and expansion of the Salafi identi-
ty. Their involvement comes to complete the Salafi men’s commitment, by educating 
14 “(…) and when you ask [his wives] for something, ask them from behind a partition. That is purer 
for your hearts and their hearts.” Surah 33 Al-Ahzâb (The Combined Forces), verse 53. 
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wom en. In an environment where gender mixing is not allowed, women play a strategic 
and central role in the expansion of da’wa salafiyya (Salafi Call) within closed female 
circles. Sophia reported that “it happened sometimes that a sheikh came to give us les-
sons”. But when he came, he stayed in a corner of the meeting room, sitting on a chair 
behind the door opened from inside, to mark a separation between him and the women. 
He provided preach with a microphone, and the women who wanted to ask a question 
wrote it on paper. There was no discussion between them. The man/woman relation here 
is not seen as a dominated balance of power, but rather as being in line with virtue. So 
gender mixing is not allowed, but as illustrated by Ni‘mat Sidki’s case, women can still 
be influential to a certain degree – Sidki wrote tazkilla (letter of recommendation), to 
recommend someone for the Ansâr as-sunnah movement. 
These Salafi marked-off communities – developed around closed circles’ accessible 
only for those who have a recommendation, we enter in salafi circles by cooptation – 
had long kept a low profile until the revolutionary uprisings broke out and shed a diffe-
rent light on these groups. 
3 Da’wa Siyasiyya15 and Salafiyyât’s Participation in 
Building Up a Salafi Constituency
The appearance of Salafism on the political scene and salafiyât’s accession to politics 
provoked a crisis within the movements of the minhaj salafi. The religious dignitaries of 
Ansâr as-Sunnah, well known for being close to the security apparatus of the Moubarak 
regime, attempted to deter Salafi members from taking part in the 2011 demonstrations. 
Members of the Salafi Call association (Da‘wa salafiyya) – one of the most influential 
Salafi associations created in 1977 by religious students at Alexandria University – de-
nounced women’s participation in politics and their increased visibility in the media, 
after they were granted a bigger place in the political sphere. The initiators of the Da‘wa 
salafiyya were members of the faculty of medicine. They did not choose to learn re-
ligious education in university like the ones of Ansâr as-Sunnah. Unlike the founder 
of the latter organisation, who was trained at al-Azhar university, the initiators of the 
Da‘wa salafiyya received their religious education at Egyptian private schools, founded 
and run by members of Ansâr as-Sunnah. The founders of Da‘wa salafiyya always kept 
a distance with this political scene and devoted themselves solely to preaching until the 
coming of the Arab Spring. 
In the following, I will outline the development of this new feminine visibility in 
a broader context of reconfiguration of the Salafi milieu in Egypt. First, I will analyse 
the rhetorical changes that occurred through a critical view on the discourses of newly 
politicised sheikhs. I will then study the evolution of the electoral campaigns in which 
salafiyât participated. Finally, I will depict how, after chanting the 2011 Revolution slo-
gans along with men, Salafi women have seized the opportunity to take a more central 
role within the movement. 
15 Political preach.
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3.1  Access to Politics and the Crisis of Salafism in Egypt
Salafi participation in the revolutionary uprisings – followed by the formation of Salafi 
political parties – induced profound divisions within the Salafi movements in Egypt. 
The internal crisis has mainly been caused by religious rhetoric arguments coming from 
stances hitherto held by Egyptian Salafi pacifists. They were more inclined to respect 
what Nabil Mouline calls the principle of the three Os (e.g. with “my translation”): 
“respect of the Orthodoxy, the Orthopraxy and the religious Order” (Mouline 2011: 44). 
This stance implies, inter alia, that Salafis stay away from the political arena. This crisis 
has been particularly striking when newly founded Salafi parties decided to abide by 
the new electoral rules and therefore to integrate women within the partisan interplay. 
This dilemma of women’s participation in the political game evoked discontent and mis-
understandings among supporters of the Salafi minhâj; particularly those of the da’wa 
salafiyya movement, one of the most important Salafi bodies in Egypt. The founders of 
the Salafi Call all have over time managed to create strong roots in the country as part 
of its plan to become a mass movement, while the Ansâr as-Sunnah school has a rather 
elitist approach. Out of the da‘wa salafiyya emerged the al-Nûr party, the most promi-
nent Salafi political party today. 
Complying with these regulations and incorporating women within the realm of 
pol itics caused an outcry among the ranks of the association, who saw in these brand-
new practices a mockery of the “real Islam” (Hegghammer 2009: 249). To ease sup-
porters’ minds and try to convince them of the religious legitimacy and validity of the 
proceedings, a series of conferences was held about the issue of “the Muslim woman 
and her political and partisan participation”16. During these conferences that took place 
all over Egypt, Da‘wa salafiyya’s sheikhs stressed the legitimacy and the need to inte-
grate women in politics. We attended one of these conferences held by the al-Nûr party’s 
in Alexandria on 15 October 2011. 
The conference was entitled: “The Egyptian woman’s role in the political work”. 
During the conference, several figures intervened, e.g. ‘Imad al-Dîn ‘Abd al-Ghafour, 
president of the al-Nûr party at that time, Yasser Bourhami, co-founder and vice pre-
sident of the Da‘wa salâfiyya organisation, and the Salafi preacher Hâzim Choumân. 
Hundreds of women wearing black niqâbs were attending the conference, separated 
from men. Yasser Bourhami told the audience why participation of the “moultazimâte 
sisters” was legitimate and explained that women’s entry in the al-Nûr party was not a 
choice but a combination of circumstances. He added that the party had the chance to be 
part of the next legislature and that it was essential to seize the opportunity. To him, win-
ning seats was worth complying with the constitution and the electoral rules; meaning 
to place women on electoral lists. He asked women to take up their rights off ered by the 
then freshly adopted set of laws. He insisted that the “Akhawâte” (the sisters in God) 
were never absent of the association’s activities. “Our women have a role in society, a 
public and a professional one. Their role is educational: they are in charge of fuelling 
political inspiration to other sisters to invest the political field”. I observed that women 
were sought after because they were considered the best advocates for a feminine con-
16 www.islamonline.net/1879; www.wonews.net/ar/index.php?act=post&id=723; www.anasalafy.
com/ play.php?catsmktba=30263.
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stituency by spreading propaganda within their families. As much as they were formerly 
missioned to preach the “real Islam” within their families, they were now called to 
advocate that the Salafi vote was directed at God and that it was important to elect sup-
porters of the salafiyya. Bourhami’s discourse targeted also the opponents of women’s 
participation in the party. He reassured them that he would not agree on seeing a woman 
running a constituency or a country. Bourhami illustrate the position women should 
have within the party: like during the prayer at the mosque, women are present but in 
the “backdrop”. This demonstrates for him that women have always participated as 
multazimât in the “Islamic project” and therefore can take part in the party. He re ferred 
to Aïcha, wife of the Prophet Mohamed, and so did ‘Imad al-Dîn ‘Abd  al-Ghafour. The 
latter insisted on the importance of women’s investment to support the party in post-
uprising parliamentary elections. He also brought up the fact that women had always 
been involved in organising the umma17. He recalled that “Sayida Aïcha would come 
along the prophet during battles and take care of the wounded helping men; as Sayida 
Safia, daughter of ‘Abd al-Mutalib” (the Prophet’s uncle). Through this example, he 
urged women “to fulfil their role in developing the Islamic community and [invite them] 
to promote the party”.
Sheikh Chûmân held a speech entitled “man antî?” (Who are you?). This interven-
tion clearly illustrates the game-changing shift in the Salafi rhetoric. We identified a 
nationalist discourse that overlapped the religious discourse. Besides having for the first 
time religiously-affiliated political parties in Egypt, there was a Salafi party that assim-
ilated heavy-handed Salafi discourse with citizenship. The question “Who are you?” 
was making women aware that they were Muslim but also citizens with rights and du-
ties. “They have to take up these rights and run for parliamentary elections (…). They 
have to see this as an opportunity to extend the umma”. This discourse seemed to be 
more strategic than really heartfelt. The Salafi political actors used a rhetorical gender 
approach to convince their conservative base of accepting Salafi women participation 
to the elections setting a clear limit to women’s role by confining them to a strict gender 
role whereby women candidates would only interact with other women. Their primary 
goal of the male political leaders was to entice women to participate in the election and 
help them through the process.
3.2  Salafi Women in the Electoral Terrain: The 2011–2012/2015 
Parliamentary Elections and Evolutions
To integrate women in al-Nûr party, the organization set up a substructure dedicated to 
and managed by women. A women’s section was thereupon created and presided over 
by Hanân ‘Allam, who had always been very active in the party. As representative of the 
female members of the party she regularly organises meetings with female counterparts. 
Allam participates in the party’s meetings, open to men and women alike. In her 
speeches, available on her Facebook page18, she encourages women to take part to pol-
itics. She starts off each of her speeches as follows: “Women amount to half of the 
Egyptian society and they educate the other half”. The discourse is part of the so-called 
17 Islamic community.
18 www.facebook.com/Dr.Hanan.Allam/
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“Islamist feminism”19 (Hussein 2015: 13). This new form of discourse and action has 
shaken up the established religious order. As previously mentioned, this discourse was 
part of the shift in the structure and the rhetoric of the Salafi movement. Allam’s stance – 
though going against Salafi Islamic principles – is tackling issues such as women, fam-
ily, children and education in accordance with the “gender role” promoted by the Salafi 
movement. She carefully remains within the given frames: we never heard  al-Nûr’s 
women express their views on foreign affairs or on international politics. 
A series of actions has been taken to canalise the feminine Salafi electorate. Ac-
cordingly, Facebook pages were created for each governorate along with a main page 
entitled “Banât hizb al-Nûr: malikât ‘alâ ‘arch al-dahâ’” (Al-Nûr Party’s girls: queens 
on the wisdom’s throne). This Facebook page targeted young female electors, offering 
guidance through the electoral process. Hence, a series of trainings was set up for al-
Nûr party’s female runners20 from 2013 onwards. It seems that no such trainings had 
been held previously. In 2011, there was no need for such trainings; women’s quotas 
imposed by electoral laws were respected by the al-Nûr party. They just put names of 
female members at the bottom of their electoral lists. Back then, women of the al-Nûr 
party did not run individually and did not pound the campaigning pavement. During the 
2011-2012 parliamentary elections, two thirds of the seats were reserved to the parties in 
the Majlis al-sha‘b’ (People’s Assembly). This competition was essential to win in the 
newly drawn and extended constituencies. Women who were already listed did not have 
to campaign. In ads, they were represented by images of roses.  
During the 2015 parliamentary elections, single-member districts were given more 
weight than list candidates21. In this context, the al-Nûr party had to prove its flexibility. 
Indeed, it had become extremely unpopular following its stance against the Muslim 
Brotherhood in 2013, supporting General al-Sissi’s coup. In 2013, the al-Nûr party split 
up: Abdu-al-Ghafour set up the al-Watan party and was replaced by Younes  Makhyoun. 
Inner struggles weakened the party. Abdu-al-Ghafour knew that he would lose part of 
his constituency for two reasons: he had lost his credibility in the eyes of the Salafi 
electorate for backing the military while mainstream media were demonising his party 
along with the Muslim Brotherhood. Backing the army was a tactical bet meant to 
enable the party to remain in the realm of politics (Lacroix 2016: 32). Following the 
party’s demonization by mainstream media, the Islamist vote was no longer popular. As 
the deputy secretary of the party Râmî Hawâ22 revealed in an interview: “The aim of the 
party in the parliamentary elections is to keep existing in the country’s political sphere”. 
The al-Nûr party hence sent out women on the electoral terrain in several governor-
ates without risking much23. More than 20 women campaigned all over the country as 
19 Here, “Islamist” is used to refer to the heavy-handed religious discourse of these women. They are 
different from Islamic feminists through their references and reading of the religious scriptures.
20 www.youm7.com/story/2015/5/25/2197379/حزب-النور-يعقد-دورات-تدريبية-لنسائه-قبل-
الانتخابات-البرلماني
21 The mixed member proportional representation (MMP) was chosen as electoral system for 2011–
2012 and 2015 parliamentary elections. Voters had two votes, one for their single-member district 
and one for the party list. The number of seats for each kind of vote was determined by the elec-
toral council.  
22 Interview with Rami Hawa (27 November 2015).
23 www.tahrirnews.com/posts/131268/انفراد...+أسماء+مرشحات+«النور»+في+البرلمان+المقبل
3_Gender1-17_SP_Bouras_030-043.indd   40 23.02.2017   18:05:48
From Salafi Preaching to Political Preaching    41
GENDER 1 | 2017
single-member candidates. Amongst the candidates was Magda Shalabî, a dâ‘iya in 
her forties, a former candidate of the al-Nûr party, during the 2011–2012 parliamentary 
elections, who ran in the Beheira constituency. She campaigned in public spaces and 
answering journalists’ questions. She was aired on TV where she remained particularly 
evasive as regards her political programme. If elected, she stated she would focus on 
education and health. Once aired on the popular ‘Arch Samâ’s show a viewer, most 
likely belonging to the minhaj salafi, harshly denounced the runner’s discourse and 
clothing arguing that she [the viewer] did not identify with her24. She further said that 
Shalabî’s behaviour had nothing to do with the Prophet’s wife’s behaviour. So, on the 
one hand, supporters of the minhaj salafi attacked female runners coming out public-
ly, on the other hand, liberals accused Salafis of making the country go backward and 
denounced women’s candidacies as the incarnation of this backwardness, especially 
with regard to questions pertaining to women’s role in the society. Salafis of the al-Nûr 
party seemed to use women to gain legitimacy and to show their respect for democratic 
principles and women’s rights promotion, being aligned with Egypt’s main political 
concerns. On the other hand, they had to give in to minhaj salafi’s supporters who still 
remained the core of their constituency and had to resist the liberals’ relentless attacks 
on their rigorous practice of Islam. 
4 Conclusion: Women’s Evolution in Salafi Milieus: From 
Indoors to Outdoors
The participation of Salafi women in the 2011s uprising, then in the politicization proc-
ess of various Salafi movements, has given to these women an exposure they did not 
have before. Indeed, they appeared in public, politics and media scene, breaking with 
the Salafi religious discourse which confines them to a private and unexposed sphere. 
Thus, we saw through our article how women have invested first the preaching field 
with the expansion of the Salafi ideology, in the 70s. A period tied with a feminisation 
of the religious sphere and an active involvement of women in pious circles. So the in-
vestment of women in the Salafi milieu during the 70s changes concomitantly with the 
spread of the Salafi discourse through the middle and poor social class. Women became 
thereby an important vector of distribution of the Salafi discourse. 
After being active in the preaching field, they have followed the Salafi movements 
in their politicization, and this article focused on one of the more influential Salafi 
move ment, the Da’wa Salafiyya Association, and the political party which emerge from 
this movement, al-Nûr party. Indeed, we saw how the coming of this Salafi movement 
in the political stage provoked a shift in the religious discourse, due to the integration of 
new values of democracy, citizenship and women access to politics. The Salafi  al-Nûr 
party contains a women’s section that has the specific role to exclusively look after 
wom en constituencies and people from their family circle. They were not much exposed 
by the al-Nûr party during the first parliamentary elections in 2011 as most seats were 
won through a proportional system with electoral list. But during the 2015 Parliament 
election, women were sent to constituencies as individual candidates, campaigning 
24 www.youtube.com/watch?v=VhhGQne9z1o
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in various Egyptian districts. We observed an active involvement of Salafi women in 
the “preaching” of the Salafi vote, using the same Salafi network in order to gather an 
 electorate. They then followed the Salafi movement from the da’wa salafiyya to what 
we called “the da’wa siyassiyya”.
Hence, new voices emerged in both the media and the political sphere. During the 
2011 demonstrations, these women used the democratic revolutionary slogans and dis-
course to redefine their positions. The revolutionary discourse had a performative power, 
which allowed women to cross borders of the closed Salafi circles. Here, the concept of 
“performativity”, developed by Judith Butler (1990), can be referred to. Butler’s perfor-
mativity goes beyond language and includes not only speech, but also conventions as 
well as adopted attitudes and gestures. The use of the revolutionary rhetoric – and par-
ticularly the uprising’s most important slogan demanding the respect of human dignity, 
work and freedom (karâma; huriyya; ‘amal), – and women’s increased public exposure 
had an impact on their empowerment and in Salafi circles. Women’s participation seems 
to have redefined their relationship with the da’iya authority figure and to have opened 
new kinds of initiatives.
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